Al-Ghazâlî (c.1056–1111) was one of themost prominent and influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, andmystics of Sunni Islam. He was active at a time when Sunni theology hadjust passed through its consolidation and entered a period of intensechallenges from Shiite Ismâ’îlite theology and theArabic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy (falsafa).Al-Ghazâlî understood the importance of falsafaand developed a complex response that rejected and condemned some ofits teachings, while it also allowed him to accept and apply others.Al-Ghazâlî's critique of twenty positions offalsafa in his Incoherence of the Philosophers(Tahâfut al-falâsifa) is a significant landmark inthe history of philosophy as it advances the nominalist critique ofAristotelian science developed later in 14th century Europe. On theArabic and Muslim side al-Ghazâlî's acceptance of demonstration(apodeixis) led to a much more refined and precise discourseon epistemology and a flowering of Aristotelian logics and metaphysics.With al-Ghazâlî begins the successful introduction ofAristotelianism or rather Avicennism into Muslim theology. After aperiod of appropriation of the Greek sciences in the translationmovement from Greek into Arabic and the writings of thefalâsifa up to Avicenna (Ibn Sînâ,c.980–1037), philosophy and the Greek sciences were“naturalized” into the discourse of kalâmand Muslim theology (Sabra 1987). Al-Ghazâlî'sapproach to resolving apparent contradictions between reason andrevelation was accepted by almost all later Muslim theologians and had,via the works of Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–98) and Jewish authorsa significant influence on Latin medieval thinking.
First published Tue Aug 14, 2007; substantive revision Mon Sep 22, 2014
1. Life
AsSalaamu Alaikum, Bidayat al-Hidayah - 'The Beginning of Guidance' by Imam al-Ghazali Mishkat al-Anwaar - 'The Niche of Lights' by Imam al-Ghazali Ayyuha al-Walad - 'Beloved Son' by Imam al-Ghazali Naseehat al-Muluk - 'Counsel for Kings' by Imam al-Ghazali asSalaamu Alaikum. Al-Ghazālī, Muslim theologian and mystic whose great work, Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm ad-dīn (“The Revival of the Religious Sciences”), made Ṣūfism (Islāmic mysticism) an acceptable part of orthodox Islām. Al-Ghazālī was born at Ṭūs (near Meshed in eastern Iran) and was educated there, then in Jorjān, and finally.
Later Muslim medieval historians say that Abû HâmidMuhammad ibn Muhammad al-Ghazâlî was born in 1058 or 1059in Tabarân-Tûs (15 miles north of modern Meshed, NE Iran),yet notes about his age in his letters and his autobiography indicatethat he was born in 1055 or 1056 (Griffel 2009,23–25). Al-Ghazâlî received his early education inhis hometown of Tus together with his brother Ahmad(c.1060–1123 or 1126) who became a famous preacher andSufi scholar. Muhammad went on to study with the influentialAsh’arite theologian al-Juwaynî (1028–85) at theNizâmiyya Madrasa in nearby Nishapur. This brought him in closecontact with the court of the Grand-Seljuq Sultan Malikshâh(reg. 1071–92) and his grand-vizier Nizâm al-Mulk(1018–92). In 1091 Nizâm al-Mulk appointedal-Ghazâlî to the prestigious Nizâmiyya Madrasa inBaghdad. In addition to being a confidante of the Seljuq Sultan andhis court in Isfahan, he now became closely connected to the caliphalcourt in Baghdad. He was undoubtedly the most influential intellectualof his time, when in 1095 he suddenly gave up his posts in Baghdad andleft the city. Under the influence of Sufi literatureal-Ghazâlî had begun to change his lifestyle two yearsbefore his departure (Griffel 2009, 67). He realized that the highethical standards of a virtuous religious life are not compatible withbeing in the service of sultans, viziers, and caliphs. Benefiting fromthe riches of the military and political elite implies complicity intheir corrupt and oppressive rule and will jeopardize one's prospectof redemption in the afterlife. When al-Ghazâlî leftBaghdad in 1095 he went to Damascus and Jerusalem and vowed at thetomb of Abraham in Hebron never again to serve the politicalauthorities or teach at state-sponsored schools. He continued toteach, however, at small schools (singl.zâwiya) that were financed by private donations. Afterperforming the pilgrimage in 1096, al-Ghazâlî returned viaDamascus and Baghdad to his hometown Tûs, where he founded asmall private school and a Sufi convent (khânqâh).In 1106, at the beginning of the 6th century in the Muslim calendar,al-Ghazâlî broke his vow and returned to teaching at thestate-sponsored Nizâmiyya Madrasa in Nishapur, where he himselfhad been a student. To his followers he justified this step with thegreat amount of theological confusion among the general public andpressure from authorities at the Seljuq court (al-Ghazâlî1959a, 45–50 = 2000b, 87–93). Al-Ghazâlî regardedhimself as one of the renewers (singl. muhyî) ofreligion, who, according to a hadîth, will come everynew century. He continued to teach at his zâwiya inTûs where he died in 1111 (Griffel 2009, 20–59).
2. Al-Ghazâlî's Reports of the falâsifa's Teachings
After having already made a name for himself as a competent authorof legal works, al-Ghazâlî published around 1095 a numberof books where he addresses the challenges posed by falsafaand by the theology of the Ismâ’îlite Shiites. Themovement of falsafa (from Greek:philosophía) resulted from the translation of Greekphilosophical and scientific literature into Arabic from the 8th to theearly 10th centuries. The Arabic philosophers (falâsifa)were heirs to the late-antique tradition of understanding the works ofAristotle in Neoplatonic terms. In philosophy the translators fromGreek into Arabic focused on the works of Aristotle and although somedistinctly Neoplatonic texts were translated into Arabic—mostnotably the pseudo-Aristotelian Theology, a compilation fromPlotinus' Enneads—the most significant Neoplatoniccontributions reached the Arabs by way of commentaries on the works ofthe Stagirite (Wisnovsky 2003, 15). Falsafa was a movementwhere Christians, Muslims, and even pagan authors participated. Afterthe 12th century it would also include Jewish authors. For reasons thatwill become apparent, al-Ghazâlî focused his comments onthe Muslim falâsifa. In the early 10th centuryal-Fârâbî (d. 950) had developed asystemic philosophy that challenged key convictions held by Muslimtheologians, most notably the creation of the world in time and theoriginal character of the information God reveals to prophets.Following Aristotle, al-Fârâbî taught that the worldhas no beginning in the past and that the celestial spheres, forinstance, move from pre-eternity. Prophets and the revealed religionsthey bring articulate the same insights that philosophers express intheir teachings, yet the prophets use the method of symbolization tomake this wisdom more approachable for the ordinary people. Avicennacontinued al-Fârâbî's approach and developedhis metaphysics and his prophetology to a point where it offerscomprehensive explanations of God's essence and His actions aswell as a psychology that gives a detailed account of how prophetsreceive their knowledge and how they, for instance, perform miraclesthat confirm their missions. Avicenna's philosophy offersphilosophical explanations of key Muslim tenets like God's unity(tawhîd) and the central position of prophets amonghumans.
In his autobiography al-Ghazâlî writes that during his timeat the Baghdad Nizâmiyya he studied the works of thefalâsifa for two years before he wrote hisIncoherence of the Philosophers in a third year(Ghazâlî 1959a, 18 = 2000b, 61). It is hardly credible,however, that al-Ghazâlî began to occupy himself withfalsafa only after he became professor at the Nizâmiyyain Baghdad. This account is apologetic and aims to reject the claim ofsome of his critics that he had learned falsafa before his ownreligious education was complete. Most probably he had becomeacquainted with falsafa while studying with al-Juwaynî,whose works already show an influence from Avicenna.Al-Ghazâlî's response to Aristotelianism, theIncoherence of the Philosophers, is a masterwork ofphilosophical literature and may have been decades in the making. Itis accompanied by works where al-Ghazâlî provides faithfulreports of the philosophers' teachings. Two of those works have comedown to us. The first is an almost complete fragment of a long bookwhere al-Ghazâlî copies or paraphrases passages from theworks of philosophers and combines them to a comprehensive reportabout their teachings in metaphysics (Griffel 2006, al-Akiti2009). The fragment unfortunately bears no title. The second work,the Doctrines of the Philosophers (Maqâsidal-falâsifa, on the translation of the title see Shihadeh2011, 90–92), is a loosely adapted Arabic translation of theparts on logics, metaphysics, and the natural sciences in Avicenna'sPersian work Philosophy for ‘Alâ’ al-Dawla(Dânishnamah-yi Alâ’î) (Janssens1986). Previously it has been assumed that the Doctrines of thePhilosophers was written as a preparatory study to his majorwork, the Incoherence. This can no longer be upheld. Bothreports of al-Ghazâlî stand only in a very looseconnection to the text of the Incoherence of thePhilosophers. The Incoherence and theDoctrines use different terminologies and the latter presentsits material in ways that does not support the criticism in theIncoherence (Janssens 2003, 43–45). The Doctrinesof the Philosophers may have been a text that was initiallyunconnected to the Incoherence or that was generated after thecomposition of the latter. Only its introduction and its briefexplicit create a connection to the refutation in theIncoherence. These parts were almost certainly written (oradded) after the publication of the Incoherence (Janssens2003, 45; Griffel 2006, 9–10).
The Doctrines of the Philosophers was translated into Latinin the third quarter of the 12th century and into Hebrew first in 1292and at least another two times within the next fifty years. Thesetranslations enjoyed much more success than the Arabic original. Infact, in the Latin as well as in the Hebrew traditions theyovershadowed all of al-Ghazâlî's other writings. The Latintranslation, sometimes referred to as Logica et philosophiaAlgazelis, was the only book by al-Ghazâlî translatedduring the period of the transmission of Arabic philosophy toChristian Europe (the part on logic is edited in Lohr 1965, the tworemaining parts on metaphysics and the natural sciences inal-Ghazâlî 1933). It was translated by DominicusGundisalivi (Gundissalinus, d. c. 1190) of Toledo incollaboration with someone referred to as “MagisterIohannes” (d. 1215), also known as Iohannes Hispanus (orHispalensis), probably an Arabized Christian (a Mozarab), who was deanat the cathedral of Toledo in the 1180s and 1190s (Burnett 1994). Thetwo translators seem to have omitted the short introduction and theexplicit where the work is described as an uncommitted reportof the falâsifa's teachings. A small number of Latinmanuscripts show signs that this translation was revised during the13th century (Lohr 1965, 229) and in one case they preserve a Latinrendition of al-Ghazâlî's original introduction (edited inSalman 1935, 125–27). That, however, had next to no influence onthe text's reception (Salman 1935), and the version that circulatedamong readers of Latin does not include al-Ghazâlî'sdistancing statements (al-Ghazâlî 1506). The book thusconcealed its character as a report of Avicenna's teachings and itsauthor “Algazel” was considered a faithful follower ofAvicenna who had produced a masterful compendium of the latter'sphilosophy. During the 12th and 13th centuries the Logica etphilosophia Algazelis was a principal source for Latin authors onthe teachings of the Arabic philosophers (d’Alverny 1986; Alonso1958). Al-Ghazâlî's identification as one of them isusually attributed to the limited knowledge of Latin scholars aboutmatters relating to the authors of the texts they read. Theassumption, however, that the Doctrines of the Philosophersis not merely a report of the teachings of the falâsifabut rather represents al-Ghazâlî's genuine positions inphilosophy is not limited to the Latin tradition. There are Arabicmanuscripts that attribute a text that is quite similar tothe Doctrines of the Philosophers to al-Ghazâlîwithout mentioning that the teachings therein are an uncommittedreport. The oldest of these manuscripts was produced at the beginningof the 13th century at Maragheh, an important center of scholarship inNW Iran and is available in facsimile (Pourjavady 2002,2–62). It shows that also in the Arabic tradition, the positionsreported in theDoctrines of the Philosophy were closely associated withal-Ghazâlî. The “mis-identification” ofal-Ghazâlî as a follower of Avicenna may have its roots inan attitude among some Arabic readers of al-Ghazâlî who sawin him a closer follower of the falâsifa than themainstream Arabic tradition wished to acknowledge.
In its several Hebrew versions, al-Ghazâlî'sDoctrines of the Philosophers (known asDe’ôt ha-fîlôsôfîm andKavvanôt ha-fîlôsôfîm) was oneof the most widespread philosophical texts studied among Jews inEurope (Steinschneider 1893, 1:296–326; Harvey 2001). Thetranslator of the first Hebrew version of 1292, the Jewish AverroistIsaac Albalag, attached his own introduction and extensive notes tothe text (Vajda 1960). This and the other two Hebrew translationsattracted a great number of commentators, including Moses Narboni(d. 1362), who was active in southern France and Spain, and MosesAlmosnino (d. c.1580) of Thessalonica (Steinschneider 1893,1:311–25). Al-Ghazâlî'sDoctrines of the Philosophers was a very popular text up tothe 16th century and over 50 manuscripts of the Hebrew translationsare extant (Eran 2007). Some Jewish scholars, like the 14th centuryKatalan Hasdai Crescas, saw in this Avicennan text a welcomealternative to the equally widespread teachings of Averroes (Harveyand Harvey 2002). Although the Hebrew translations make the characterof the work as a report clear, al-Ghazâlî was—as inthe Latin tradition—regarded as a much closer followerof falsafa than in the mainstream Arabic tradition. TheHebrew tradition, for instance, makes widely available the translationof a text ascribed to al-Ghazâlî where the author respondsto questions about astronomy and cosmology that are quite far fromAsh'arism and much closer to Aristotelianism (Langermann 2011). Thisrelatively widespread Hebrew text (edited and translated inal-Ghazâlî 1896), referred to asTeshuvôt she'alôt, “Answers to Questions,” ormore recently as the “Hebrew Ajwiba,” is known in its Arabicoriginal only from a very small number of manuscripts, among them theone from Maragheh (Pourjavady 2002, 63–99). Accounts saying thatal-Ghazâlî taught philosophical positions he had openlycondemned in hisIncoherence were relatively widespread in Hebrew literature(Marx 1935, 410, 422–24). Moses Narboni, for instance, believedthat al-Ghazâlî used a stratagem to teach philosophy at atime when it was, according to Narboni, officially prohibited. Bypretending to refute philosophy in his Incoherence he couldjustify the writing of the Doctrines. TheDoctrines is therefore the main work on philosophy byal-Ghazâlî, Narboni suspected, while theIncoherence serves only the function of legitimizing theformer's publication by saying that a refutation must rely on athorough knowledge of what is to be refuted (Chertoff 1952, part 2,6–7). This tendency among Hebrew authors to disentangleal-Ghazâlî from the criticism of philosophy expressed inhis Incoherence led the Algerian Jewish scholar AbrahamGavison (fl. 16th cent.) to report erroneously thatal-Ghazâlî was the author of both TheIncoherence of the Philosophers as well as its repudiationThe Incoherence of the Incoherence (Tahâfutal-tahâfut), a work in reality written by Averroes (Gavison1748, fol. 135a). In addition to his Doctrines,his Incoherence, which was translated in 1411, and the textknown as Teshuvôt she'alôt (whose ascription toal-Ghazâlî is still uncertain), at least two other worksby al-Ghazâlî were translated intoHebrew: Mishkât al-anwârand Mîzân al-'amal (Steinschneider 1893,1:326–48, the text Moznei ha-'iyyunîm mentionedthere is not by al-Ghazâlî).
3. Al-Ghazâlî's “Refutations” of falsafa and Ismâ’îlism
Al-Ghazâlî describes the Incoherence of thePhilosophers as a “refutation” (radd) of thephilosophical movement (Ghazâlî 1959a, 18 = 2000b, 61), andthis has contributed to the erroneous assumption that he opposedAristotelianism and rejected its teachings. His response tofalsafa was far more complex and allowed him to adopt many ofits teachings. The falâsifa are convinced, al-Ghazâlîcomplains at the beginning of the Incoherence, that their wayof knowing by “demonstrative proof” (burhân)is superior to theological knowledge drawn from revelation and itsrational interpretation. This conviction led “a group” among the Muslimfalâsifa to disregard Islam and to neglect its ritualduties and its religious law (sharî’a). In hisIncoherence al-Ghazâlî discusses twenty keyteachings of the falâsifa and rejects the claim thatthese teachings are demonstratively proven. In a detailed and intricatephilosophical discussion al-Ghazâlî aims to show that noneof the arguments in favor of these twenty teachings fulfills the highepistemological standard of demonstration (burhân) thatthe falâsifa have set for themselves. Rather, thearguments supporting these twenty convictions rely upon unprovenpremises that are accepted only among the falâsifa, butare not established by reason. By showing that these positions aresupported by mere dialectical arguments al-Ghazâlî aims todemolish what he regarded was an epistemological hubris on the side ofthe falâsifa. In the Incoherence he wishes toshow that the falâsifa practice taqlîd,meaning they merely repeat these teachings from the founders of theirmovement without critically examining them (Griffel 2005).
The initial argument of the Incoherence focuses onapodeixis and the demonstrative character of the argumentsrefuted therein. While the book also touches on the truth of theseteachings, it “refutes” numerous positions whose truthsal-Ghazâlî acknowledges or which he subscribed to in hislater works. In these cases al-Ghazâlî wishes to show thatwhile these particular philosophical teachings are sound and true, theyare not demonstrated. The ultimate source of thefalâsifa's knowledge about God's nature, thehuman soul, or about the heavenly spheres, for instance, are therevelations given to early prophets such as Abraham and Moses. Theirinformation made it into the books of the ancient philosophers whofalsely claimed that they gained these insights by reason alone.
Among the twenty discussions of the Incoherence, sixteen areconcerned with positions held in the falâsifa'smetaphysics (ilâhiyyât) and four with positionsthat appear in their natural sciences(tabî’iyyât). The 17th discussion oncausality will be analyzed below. The longest and most substantialdiscussion is the first, which deals with Avicenna's andal-Fârâbî's arguments in favor of theworld's pre-eternity (Hourani 1958, Marmura 1959).Al-Ghazâlî denies that this position can be demonstrativelyproven and draws from arguments that were earlier developed byanti-Aristotelian critics such as the Christian JohnPhiloponus (Yahyâ l-Nahwî,c.490–c.570) of Alexandria. Philoponus' arguments, mostimportantly those that deny the possibility of an infinite number ofevents in the past, had entered the Arabic discourse on theworld's creation earlier during the 9th century (Davidson 1987,55–56, 86–116, 366–75).
At the end of the Incoherence al-Ghazâlî askswhether the twenty positions discussed in the book are in conflictwith the religious law (sharî’a). Most of themare wrong, he says, yet pose no serious problems in terms of religion,where they should be considered “innovations”(singl. bid'a). A small group of positions is consideredwrong as well as religiously problematic. These are three teachingsfrom Avicenna's philosophy, namely (1) that the world has no beginningin the past and is not created in time, (2) that God's knowledgeincludes only classes of beings (universals) and does not extend toindividual beings and their circumstances (particulars), and (3) thatafter death the souls of humans will never again return intobodies. In these three cases the teachings of Islam, which are basedon revelation, suggest the opposite, al-Ghazâlî says, andthus overrule the unfounded claims of the falâsifa.What's more, these three teachings may mislead the public todisregarding the religious law (sharî’a) and are,therefore, dangerous for society (Griffel 2000, 301–3). In hisfunction as a Muslim jurisprudent al-Ghazâlî adds a brieffatwâ at the end of his Incoherence anddeclares that everybody who teaches these three positions publicly isan unbeliever (kâfir) and an apostate from Islam, whocan be killed (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 226).
Al-Ghazâlî's efforts in dealing with thephilosophical movement amount to defining the boundaries of religioustolerance in Islam. Soon after the Incoherence, he wrote asimilar book about the movement of the Ismâ’îliteShiites, known as the “Bâtinites” (“those whoarbitrarily follow an inner meaning in the Qur’an”).Initially the Ismâ’îlite Shiites were supporters ofthe Fâtimid counter-caliphate in Cairo and opposed the politicaland religious authority of the Sunni caliph in Baghdad and the SeljuqSultans that he installed. During al-Ghazâlî'slifetime, however, there occurred a schism within the clandestineIsmâ’îlite movement. The “new propaganda”of the Ismâ’îlites in Iraq and Iran was nowindependent from the center in Cairo and developed its own strategies.A key element of their—not entirely unsuccessful—efforts topersuade people to their camp was their criticism of sense perceptionand of rational arguments (al-Ghazâlî 1954, 34; 1964b, 76,80). Al-Ghazâlî was closely familiar with theIsmâ’îlites' propaganda efforts but he had littlereliable information on their teachings on cosmology and metaphysics.These were deeply influenced by cosmological notions in late antiqueGnostic and Neoplatonic literature (Walker 1993, de Smet 1995).Al-Ghazâlî also did not know about the schism within themovement. In his book on the Scandals of the Esoterics(Fadâ’ih al-Bâtiniyya) he looks closely atthose teachings that he knew and discusses which of them are merelyerroneous and which are unbelief. He assumes—wrongly—thatthe Ismâ’îlite propagandists teach the existence oftwo gods. This dualism and the Ismâ’îlites'denial of bodily resurrection in the afterlife leads to theircondemnation by al-Ghazâlî as unbelievers and apostates(al-Ghazâlî 1964b, 151–55 = 2000b, 228–29).
4. The Place of falsafa in Islam
In his attempt to define the boundaries of Islamal-Ghazâlî singles out a limited number of teachings thatin his opinion overstep the borders. In a separate book, TheDecisive Criterion for Distinguishing Islam from ClandestineUnbelief (Faysal al-tafriqa bayna l-Islâmwa-l-zandaqa) he clarifies that only teachingsthat violate certain “fundamental doctrines”(usûl al-‘aqâ’id) should be deemedunbelief and apostasy. These doctrines are limited to three:monotheism, Muhammad's prophecy, and the Qur’anicdescriptions of life after death (al-Ghazâlî 1961, 195 =2002, 112). He stresses that all other teachings, including those thatare erroneous or even regarded as “religious innovations”(singl. bid’a), should be tolerated. Again otherteachings may be correct, al-Ghazâlî adds, and despitetheir philosophical background, for instance, should be accepted by theMuslim community. Each teaching must be judged by itself, and if foundsound and in accordance with revelation, should be adopted(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 25–27 = 2000b, 67–70). Thisattitude leads to a widespread application of Aristotelian teachings inal-Ghazâlî's works on Muslim theology and ethics.
Al-Ghazâlî's refutations of thefalâsifa and the Ismâ’îlites have adistinctly political component. In both cases he fears that thefollowers of these movements as well as people with only a cursoryunderstanding of them might believe that they can disregard thereligious law (sharî’a). In the case of theIsmâ’îlites there was an additional theologicalmotive. In their religious propaganda the Ismâ’îlitesopenly challenged the authority of Sunni theology, claiming itsreligious speculation and its interpretation of scripture is arbitrary.The Sunni theologians submit God's word to judgments that appearto be reasonable, the Ismâ’îlites said, yet they arepurely capricious, a fact evident from the many disputes among Sunnitheologians. No rational argument is more convincing than any of itsopposing rational arguments, the Ismâ’îlites claimed,since all rational proofs are mutually equivalent(takâfu’ al-adilla). Only the divinely guided wordof the Shiite Imam conveys certainty (al-Ghazâlî 1964b, 76,80 = 2000b, 189, 191). In response to this criticismal-Ghazâlî introduces the Aristotelian notion ofdemonstration (burhân). Sunni theologians argue amongeach other, he says, because they are largely unfamiliar with thetechnique of demonstration. For al-Ghazâlî, reason(‘aql) is executed most purely and precisely byformulating arguments that are demonstrative and reach a level wheretheir conclusions are beyond doubt. The results of true demonstrationscannot conflict with revelation, al-Ghazâlî says, sinceneither reason nor revelation can be considered false (Heer 1993,186–88). If demonstration proves something that violates theliteral meaning of revelation, the scholar must apply interpretation(ta’wîl) to the outward text and read it as asymbol of a deeper truth. There are, for instance, valid demonstrativearguments proving that God cannot have a “hand” or sit on a“throne.” These prompt the Muslim scholar to interpret theQur’anic passages where these words appear as symbols(al-Ghazâlî 1961, 175–89 = 2002, 96–103). Theinterpretation of passages in revelation, however, whose outwardmeaning is not disproved by a valid demonstration, is not allowed(Griffel 2000, 332–35; 2009, 111–16).
Al-Ghazâlî's rule for reconciling apparent conflictsbetween reason and the literal meaning of revelation was widelyaccepted by almost all later Muslim theologians, particularly thosewith rationalist tendencies. Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), however,criticized al-Ghazâlî's rule from anscriptualist angle. Ibn Taymiyya (1980,1:86–87) rejected al-Ghazâlî's implication thatin cases of conflict between reason and the revealed text, priorityshould be given to the former over the latter. He also remarked thatal-Ghazâlî's own arguments denying the possibilitythat God sits on a “throne” (Qur’an 2.255), forinstance, fail to be demonstrative. Ibn Taymiyya flatly denied thepossibility of a conflict between reason and revelation and maintainedthat the perception of such a disagreement results from subjectingrevelation to premises that revelation itself does not accept (Heer1993, 188–92).
On the falâsifa's side Averroes acceptedal-Ghazâlî's rule for reconciling conflicts betweenreason and the outward meaning of revelation but he did not agree withhis findings on what can and cannot be demonstrated (Griffel 2000, 437–61). Averroescomposed a refutation of al-Ghazâlî'sIncoherence, which he called The Incoherence of the [Book of the]Incoherence (Tahâfut al-tahâfut). This workwas translated twice into Latin in 1328 and 1526, the later one on thebasis of an earlier Hebrew translation of the text (Steinschneider1893, 1:330–38). The two Latin translations both have the titleDestructio destructionum (the later one is edited in Averroes1961). They were printed numerous times during the 16th century andmade al-Ghazâlî's criticism of Aristotelianism knownamong the Averroists of the Renaissance. The Italian Agostino Nifo(c.1473– after 1538), for instance, wrote a Latincommentary to Averroes' book. While accepting the principle thatonly a valid demonstration allows interpreting the Qur’ansymbolically, Averroes maintained that Aristotle had alreadydemonstrated the pre-eternity of the world, which would elevate it,according to al-Ghazâlî's rules, to a philosophicalas well as religious doctrine. Averroes also remarked that there is nopassage in the Qur’an that unambiguously states the creation ofthe world in time (Averroes 2001, 16). Al-Ghazâlî wasclearly aware of this but assumed that this tenet is establishedthrough the consensus (ijmâ’) of Muslimtheologians (Griffel 2000, 278, 429–30; 2002, 58). Whileal-Ghazâlî condemns the pre-eternity of the world at theend of his Incoherence of the Philosophers, the subject of theworld's pre-eternity is no longer raised in his later moresystematic work on the boundaries of Islam, TheDecisiveCriterion for Distinguishing Islam from Clandestine Unbelief.
5. The Ethics of the Revival of the Religious Sciences
Soon after al-Ghazâlî had published his two refutationsof falsafa and Ismâ’îlism he left hisposition at the Nizâmiyya madrasa in Baghdad. During this periodhe began writing what most Muslim scholars regard as his major work,The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Ihyâ’‘ulûm al-dîn). The voluminous Revivalis a comprehensive guide to ethical behavior in the everyday life ofMuslims. It is divided into four sections, each containing ten books.The first section deals with ritual practices(‘ibâdât), the second with social customs(‘âdât), the third with those things thatlead to perdition (muhlikât) and hence should beavoided, and the fourth with those that lead to salvation(munjiyât) and should be sought. In the forty books ofthe Revival al-Ghazâlî severely criticizes thecoveting of worldly matters and reminds his readers that human life isa path towards Judgment Day and the reward or punishment gained throughit. Compared with the eternity of the next life, this life is almostinsignificant, yet it seals our fate in the world to come. In hisautobiography al-Ghazâlî writes that reading Sufiliterature made him realize that our theological convictions are bythemselves irrelevant for gaining redemption in the afterlife. Not ourgood beliefs or intentions count; only our good and virtuous actionswill determine our life in the world to come. This insight promptedal-Ghazâlî to change his lifestyle and adopt the Sufi path(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 35–38 = 2000b, 77–80). In theRevival he composed a book about human actions(mu’âmalât) that wishes to steer clear ofany deeper discussion of theological insights(mukâshafât). Rather, it aims at guiding peopletowards ethical behavior that God will reward in this world and thenext (al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 1:4–5).
In the Revival al-Ghazâlî attacks his colleaguesin Muslim scholarship, questioning their intellectual capacities andindependence as well as their commitment to gaining reward in the worldto come. This increased moral consciousness bringsal-Ghazâlî close to Sufi attitudes, which have a profoundinfluence on his subsequent works such as The Niche of Lights(Mishkât al-anwâr). These later works also reveala significant philosophical influence on al-Ghazâlî. In theRevival he teaches ethics that are based on the developmentof character traits (singl., khulq, pl. akhlâq).Performing praiseworthy deeds is an effect of praiseworthy charactertraits that warrant salvation in the next life (al-Ghazâlî1937–38, 1:34.4–5). He criticizes the more traditional concept ofSunni ethics that is limited to compliance with the ordinances of thereligious law (sharî’a) and following the exampleof the Prophet Muhammad. Traditional Sunni ethics are closely linked tojurisprudence (fiqh) and limit itself, according toal-Ghazâlî, to determining and teaching the rules ofsharî’a. Traditional Sunni jurisprudents are mere“scholars of this world” (‘ulamâ’al-dunyâ) who cannot guide Muslims on the best way to gainthe afterlife (al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 1:30–38,98–140).
In his own ethics al-Ghazâlî stresses that theProphet—and no other teacher—should be the one person aMuslim emulates. He supplements this key Sunni notion with the conceptof “disciplining the soul” (riyâdatal-nafs). At birth the essence of the human is deficient andignoble and only strict efforts and patient treatment can lead ittowards developing virtuous character traits (al-Ghazâlî1937–38, book 23). The human soul's temperament, for instance,becomes imbalanced through the influence of other people and needs toundergo constant disciplining (riyâda) and training(tarbiya) in order to keep these character traits atequilibrium. Behind this kind of ethics stands the Aristotelian notionof entelechy: humans have a natural potential to developrationality and through it acquire virtuous character. Education,literature, religion, and politics should help realizing thispotential. Al-Ghazâlî became acquainted with an ethic thatfocuses on the development of virtuous character traits through theworks of Muslim falâsifa like Miskawayh (d. 1030) andMuslim scholars like al-Râghib al-Isfahânî (d.c.1025), who strove to make philosophical notions compatiblewith Muslim religious scholarship (Madelung 1974). As a resultal-Ghazâlî rejected the notion, for instance, that oneshould try to give up potentially harmful affections like anger orsexual desire. These character traits are part of human nature,al-Ghazâlî teaches, and cannot be given up. Rather,disciplining the soul means controlling these potentially harmfultraits through one's rationality (‘aql). The humansoul has to undergo constant training and needs to be disciplinedsimilar to a young horse that needs to be broken in, schooled, andtreated well.
At no point does al-Ghazâlî reveal the philosophicalorigins of his ethics. He himself saw a close connection between theethics of the falâsifa and Sufi notions of an asceticand virtuous lifestyle. In his Revival he merges these twoethical traditions to a successful and influential fusion. In hisautobiography al-Ghazâlî says that the ethics of thefalâsifa and that of the Sufis are one and thesame. Congruent with his position that many teachings and arguments ofthe falâsifa are taken from earlier revelations andfrom the divinely inspired insights of mystics, who existed already inpre-Islamic religions (Treiger 2012, 99–101) he adds that thefalâsifa have taken their ethics from the Sufis,meaning here mystics among the earlier religions(al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 24 = 2000b, 67).
Another important field where al-Ghazâlî introducedAvicennan ideas into Ash'arite kalâm in a way that thistradition eventually adopted them is human psychology and the rationalexplanation of prophecy (Griffel 2004, al-Akiti 2004). Based on partlymis-translated texts by Aristotle (Hansberger 2011), Avicennadeveloped a psychology that assumes the existence of several distinctfaculties of the soul. These faculties are stronger or weaker inindividual humans. Prophecy is the combination of three facultieswhich the prophet has in an extraordinarily strong measure. Thesefaculties firstly allow the prophet to acquire theoretical knowledgeinstantly without learning, secondly represent this knowledge throughsymbols and parables as well as divine future events, and thirdly tobring about effects outside of his body such as rain orearthquakes. These three faculties exist in every human in a smallmeasure, a fact proven by the experience of déjàvu, for instance, a phenomenon referred to in the Arabicphilosophic tradition as “the veridical dream” (al-manâmal-sâdiq). Al-Ghazâlî adopted these teachingsand appropriated them for his own purposes (Treiger 2012). Theexistence of the three faculties in human souls that make up prophecyserves for him as an explanation of the higher insights that mysticssuch as Sufi masters have in comparison to other people. Whileprophets have strong prophetic faculties and ordinary humans very weakones, the “friends of God” (awliyâ', i.e. Sufi masters)stand in between these two. They are endowed with “inspiration”(ilhâm), which is similar to prophecy and which servesin al-Ghazâlî as one of the most important sources ofhuman knoweldge. Unlike Avicenna, for whom prophets and maybe alsosome particularly talented humans ('ârifûn in hislanguage) acquire the same knowledge that philosophers reach throughapodictic reasoning, in al-Ghazâlî the prophetsand awliyâ' have access to knowledge that is superiorto that available solely through reason.
Despite the significant philosophical influence onal-Ghazâlî's ethics, he maintained in Islamic law(fiqh) the anti-rationalist Ash’arite position thathuman rationality is mute with regard to normative judgments abouthuman actions and cannot decide whether an action is “good”or “bad.” When humans think they know, for instance, thatlying is bad, their judgment is determined by a consideration of theirbenefits. With regard to the ethical value of our actions we have atendency to confuse moral value with benefit. We generally tend toassume that whatever benefits our collective interest is morally good,while whatever harms us collectively is bad. These judgments, however,are ultimately fallacious and cannot be the basis of jurisprudence(fiqh). “Good” actions are those that are rewardedin the afterlife and “bad” actions are those that arepunished (al-Ghazâlî 1904–07, 1:61). The kind ofconnection between human actions and reward or punishment in theafterlife can only be learned from revelation (Hourani 1976, Marmura1968–69). Muslim jurisprudence is the science that extractsgeneral rules from revelation. Like most religious sciences it aims atadvancing humans' prospect of redemption in the world to come.Therefore it must be based on the Qur’an and the sunnaof the Prophet while it uses logic and other rational means to extractgeneral rules.
Al-Ghazâlî was one of the first Muslim jurists whointroduced the consideration of a “public benefit”(maslaha) into Muslim jurisprudence. In addition to developingclear guidance of how to gain redemption in the afterlife, religiouslaw (sharî’a) also aims at creating an environmentthat allows each individual wellbeing and the pursuit of a virtuous andpious lifestyle. Al-Ghazâlî argues that when God revealeddivine law (sharî’a) He did so with the purpose(maqsad) of advancing human benefits in this worldand the next. Al-Ghazâlî identifies five essentialcomponents for wellbeing in this world: religion, life, intellect,offspring, and property. Whatever protects these “fivenecessities” (al-darûriyyât al-khamsa) isconsidered public benefit (maslaha) and should be advanced,while whatever harms them should be avoided. The jurisprudent(faqîh) should aim at safeguarding these fivenecessities in his legal judgments. In recommending this,al-Ghazâlî practically implies that a “maslahamursala,” a public benefit that is not mentioned in therevealed text, is considered a valid source of legislation (Opwis2007 and 2010, 65–88).
6. Cosmology in the Revival of the Religious Sciences
Despite his declared reluctance to enter into theologicaldiscussions, al-Ghazâlî addresses in his Revivalimportant philosophical problems related to human actions. In the 35thbook on “Belief in Divine Unity and Trust in God”(Kitâb al-Tawhîd wa-l-tawakkul) he discusses therelationship between human actions and God's omnipotence ascreator of the world. In this and other books of theRevival al-Ghazâlî teaches a strictlydeterminist position with regard to events in the universe. God createsand determines everything, including the actions of humans. God is theonly “agent” or the only “efficient cause”(fâ’il, the Arabic term means both) in the world.Every event in creation follows a pre-determined plan that is eternallypresent in God's knowledge. God's knowledge exists in atimeless realm and does not contain individual “cognitions”(‘ulûm) like human knowledge does. God'sknowledge does not change, for instance, when its object, the world,changes. While the events that are contained in God's knowledgeare ordered in “before” and “after”, there isno past, present, and future. God's knowledge contains the firstmoment of creation just as the last, and He knows “in Hiseternity,” for instance, whether a certain individual will end upin paradise or hell (Griffel 2009, 175–213).
For all practical purposes it befits humans to assume that God controlseverything through chains of causes (Marmura 1965, 193–96). Wewitness in nature causal processes that add up to longer causal chains.Would we be able to follow a causal chain like an “inquiringwayfarer” (sâlik sâ’il), who follows achain of events to its origin, we would be led through causal processesin the sub-lunar sphere, the “world of dominion”(‘âlam al-mulk), further to causes that exist inthe celestial spheres, the “world of sovereignty”(‘âlam al-malakût), until we would finallyreach the highest celestial intellect, which is caused by the beingbeyond it, God (al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 13:2497–509 =2001, 15–33; see also idem 1964a, 220–21). God is thestarting point of all causal chains and He creates and controls allelements therein. God is “the one who makes the causes functionas causes” (musabbib al-asbâb) (Frank 1992,18).
God's “causal” determination of all events alsoextends to human actions. Every human action is caused by theperson's volition, which is caused by a certain motive(dâ’iya). The person's volition and motiveare, in turn, caused by the person's convictions and his or herknowledge (‘ilm). Human knowledge is caused by variousfactors, like one's experience of the world, one'sknowledge of revelation, or the books one has read(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 13:2509–11 = 2001,34–37). There is no single event in this world that is notdetermined by God's will. While humans are under the impressionthat they have a free will, their actions are in reality compelled bycauses that exist within them as well as outside (Griffel 2009, 213–34).
Al-Ghazâlî viewed the world as a conglomerate ofconnections that are all pre-determined and meticulously planned inGod's timeless knowledge. God creates the universe as a hugeapparatus and employs it in order to pursue a certain goal(qasd). In two of his later works al-Ghazâlîcompares the universe with a water-clock. Here he describes threestages of its creation. The builder of the water-clock first has tomake a plan of it, secondly execute this plan and build the clock, andthirdly he has to make the clock going by supplying it with a constantsource of energy, namely the flow of water. That energy needs to becarefully measured, because only the right amount of energy willproduce the desired result. In God's creation of the universethese three stages are called judgment (hukm), decree(qadâ’), and pre-destination (qadar)(al-Ghazâlî 1971, 98–102; 1964a, 12–14). Goddesigns the universe in His timeless knowledge, puts it into being atone point in time, and provides it with a constant and well-measuredsupply of “being” (wujûd). According toAvicenna's explanation of creation—whichal-Ghazâlî was not opposed to—“being” ispassed down from God to the first and ontologically highest creationand from there in a chain of secondary efficient causes to all otherexistents. It is important to acknowledge, however, that God is theonly true efficient cause (fâ’il) in this chain.He is the only “agent,” all other beings are merely employedin His service (Griffel 2009, 236–53).
Nature is a process in which all elements harmoniously dovetail withone another. Celestial movements, natural processes, human actions,even redemption in the afterlife are all “causally”determined. Whether we will be rewarded or punished in the afterlifecan be understood, according to al-Ghazâlî, as the merecausal effect of our actions in this world. In the 32nd book of hisRevival al-Ghazâlî explains how knowing theQur’an causes the conviction (i’tiqâd) thatone is punished for bad deeds, and how that conviction may causesalvation in the afterlife:
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…and the conviction [that some humans will be punished] is acause (sabab) for the setting in of fear, and the setting inof fear is a cause for abandoning the passions and retreating from theabode of delusions. This is a cause for arriving at the vicinity ofGod, and God is the one who makes the causes function as causes(musabbib al-asbâb) and who arranges them(murattibuhâ). These causes have been made easy for him,who has been predestined in eternity to earn redemption, so thatthrough their chaining-together the causes will lead him to paradise.(al-Ghazâlî 1937–38, 11:2225.)
All these are teachings that are very close to those of Avicenna(Frank 1992, 24–25). Al-Ghazâlî also followedAvicenna in his conviction that this universe is the best of allpossible worlds and that “there is in possibility nothing morewondrous than what is” (laysa fî-l-imkânabda’ mimmâ kân) (al-Ghazâlî1937–38, 13:2515–18 = 2001, 47–50). This led to along-lasting debate among later Muslim theologians about what is meantby this sentence and whether al-Ghazâlî is, in fact, right(Ormsby 1984). It must be stressed, however, that contrary toAvicenna—and contrary to Frank's (1992, 55–63)understanding of him—al-Ghazâlî firmly held that Godexercises a genuine free will and that when He creates, He choosesbetween alternatives. God's will is not in any way determined byGod's nature or essence. God's will is the undetermineddeterminator of everything in this world.
7. Causality in al-Ghazâlî
Al-Ghazâlî's cosmology of God's determination and Hiscontrol over events in His creation through chains of causes(singl. sabab) aimed at safeguarding the Sunni doctrine ofomnipotence and divine pre-determination against the criticism ofMu’tazilites and Shiites. Humans have only the impression of afree will (ikhtiyâr). In reality they are compelled tochoose what they deem is the best action (khayr) among thepresent alternatives. Avicenna's determinist ontology, where everyevent in the created world is by itself contingent (mumkimal-wujûd bi-dhâtihi) yet also necessitated bysomething else (wâjib al-wujûd bi-ghayrihi),provided a suitable interpretation of God's pre-determination and isreadily adopted by al-Ghazâlî although he never admitsthat or uses Avicenna's language. In Avicenna the First Being, whichis God, makes all other beings and events necessary. Inal-Ghazâlî God's will, which is distinct from His essence,necessitates all beings and events in creation. The adaptation offundamental assumptions in Avicenna's cosmology together with analmost wholesale acceptance of Avicenna's psychology and hisprophetology led Frank (1992, 86) to conclude “that from atheological standpoint most of [Avicenna's] theses which he rejectedare relatively tame and inconsequential compared to those in which hefollows the philosopher.”
While al-Ghazâlî's determinist cosmology is a radicalbut faithful interpretation of the Ash’arite tenet of divinepre-determination, the way al-Ghazâlî writes about it inhis Revival and later works violates other principles ofAsh’arism and has led to much confusion among moderninterpreters. The remainder of this article will make an attempt toresolve current interpretative problems and explainal-Ghazâlî's innovative approach towardscausality.
7.1 Occasionalism versus Secondary Causality
Al-Ash’ari (873–935), the founder of the theologicalschool that al-Ghazâlî belonged to, had rejected theexistence of “natures” (tabâ’i’) and of causal connections among created beings. In a radical attemptto explain God's omnipotence, he combined several ideas that weredeveloped earlier in Muslim kalâm to what became knownas occasionalism. All material things are composed of atoms that haveno qualities or attributes but simply make up the shape of the body.The atoms of the bodies are the carrier of “accidents”(singl. ‘arad), which are attributes like weight,density, color, smell, etc. In the cosmology of al-Ash’arîall immaterial things are considered “accidents” thatinhere in a “substance” (jawhar). Only the atomsof spatially extended bodies can be substances. A person'sthoughts, for instance, are considered accidents that inhere in theatoms of the person's brain, while his or her faith is anaccident inhering in the atoms of the heart. None of the accidents,however, can subsist from one moment (waqt) to the next. Thisleads to a cosmology where in each moment God assigns the accidents tobodies in which they inhere. When one moment ends, God creates newaccidents. None of the created accidents in the second moment has anycausal relation to the ones in the earlier moment. If a body continuesto have a certain attribute from one moment to the next, then Godcreates two identical accidents inhering in that body in each of thetwo subsequent moments. Movement and development generate when Goddecides to change the arrangement of the moment before. A ball ismoved, for instance, when in the second moment of two the atoms of theball happen to be created in a certain distance from the first. Thedistance determines the speed of the movement. The ball thus jumps inleaps over the playing field and the same is true for theplayers' limbs and their bodies. This also applies to the atomsof the air if there happen to be some wind. In every moment, Godre-arranges all the atoms of this world anew and He creates newaccidents—thus creating a new world every moment (Perler/Rudolph2000, 28–62).
All Ash’arite theologians up to the generation ofal-Ghazâlî—including his teacheral-Juwaynî—subscribed to the occasionalist ontologydeveloped by al-Ash’arî. One of al-Juwaynî'slate works, the Creed for Nizâm al-Mulk(al-‘Aqîda al-Nizâmiyya), shows, however,that he already explored different ontological models, particularlywith regard to the effects of human actions (al-Juwaynî 1948,30–36; Gimaret 1980, 122–28). A purely occasionalist modelfinds it difficult to explain how God can make humans responsible fortheir own actions if they do not cause them. As a viable alternative tothe occasionalist ontology, al-Ghazâlî considered theAvicennan model of secondary causes. When God wishes to create acertain event He employs some of His own creations as mediators or“secondary causes.” God creates series of efficient causeswhere any superior element causes the existence of the inferior ones.Avicenna stresses that no causal series, in any of the four types ofcauses, can regress indefinitely. Every series of causes and effectsmust have at least three components: a first element, a middle element,and a last element. In such a chain only the first element is the causein the real sense of the word (‘illa mutlaqa) of allsubsequent elements. It causes the last element of that chain—theultimate effect—through one or many intermediaries (singl.mutawassat), which are the middle elements of the chain.Looking at a chain of efficient causes, the “finiteness of thecauses” (tanâhî l-’ilal) serves forAvicenna as the basis of a proof of God's existence. Tracing backall efficient causes in the universe will lead to a first efficientcause, which is itself uncaused. When the First Cause is also shown tobe incorporeal and numerically one, one has achieved a proof ofGod's existence (Avicenna 2005, 257–9, 270–3;Davidson 1987, 339–40).
7.2 The 17th Discussion of the Incoherence
Al-Ghazâlî offers a brief yet very comprehensiveexamination of causality within the 17th discussion of hisIncoherence of the Philosophers. The 17th discussion is nottriggered by any opposition to causality. Rather it aims at forcingal-Ghazâlî's adversaries, thefalâsifa, to acknowledge that all prophetical miraclesthat are reported in the Qur’an are possible. If theirpossibility is acknowledged, a Muslim philosopher who accepts theauthority of revelation must also admit that the prophets performedthese miracles and that the narrative in revelation is truthful.Al-Ghazâlî divides the 17th discussion into four differentsections. He presents three different “positions” (singl.maqâm) of his (various) opponents and addresses them oneby one. His response to the “second position”, which isthat of Avicenna, is further divided into two different“approaches” (singl. maslak). This four-folddivision of the 17th discussion is crucial for its understanding.Al-Ghazâlî addresses different concepts about causalitywithin the different discussions and develops not one, but at least twocoherent responses.
For a detailed discussion of the four parts in the 17th discussion thereader must be referred to chapter 6 in Griffel 2009(147–73). The following pages give only an outline ofal-Ghazâlî's overall argument. In the opening sentence ofthe 17th discussion al-Ghazâlî introduces the position hewishes to refute and he lines out elements that alternativeexplanations of causality must include in order to be acceptable foral-Ghazâlî. This opening statement is a masterwork ofphilosophical literature:
The connection (iqtirân) between what is habituallybelieved to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effectis not necessary (darûrî), according to us. But[with] any two things [that are not identical and that do not imply oneanother] (…) it is not necessary that the existence or thenonexistence of one follows necessarily (min darûra)from the existence or the nonexistence of the other (…). Theirconnection is due to the prior decision (taqdîr) of God,who creates them side by side (‘alâal-tasâwuq), not to its being necessary by itself, incapableof separation. (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 166)
Al-Ghazâlî lays out four conditions that any explanationof physical processes that is acceptable to him must fulfill: (1) theconnection between a cause and its effect is not necessary, (2) theeffect can come to exist without this particular cause (“they arenot incapable of separation”), (3) God creates two eventsconcomitant, side by side, and (4) God's creation follows a priordecision (taqdîr). On first sight, it seems that only anoccasionalist explanation of physical processes would fulfill thesefour conditions, and this is how this statement has mostly beenunderstood. Rudolph (in Perler/Rudolph 2000, 75–77), however,pointed out that not only occasionalism but other types of explanationsalso fulfill these four criteria. Most misleading is the thirdrequirement that God would need to create events “side byside.” These words seem to point exclusively to an occasionalistunderstanding of creation. One should keep in mind, however, that thisformula leaves open, how God creates events. Even anAvicennan philosopher holds that God creates the cause concomitant toits effect, and does so by means of secondary causality. While the 17thdiscussion of al-Ghazâlî's Incoherencepoints towards occasionalism as a possible solution, it also points toothers. Al-Ghazâlî chooses a certain linguistic associationto occasionalism, which has led many interpreters of this discussion tobelieve that here, he argues exclusively in favor of it.
It is important to understand that al-Ghazâlî does not denythe existence of a connection between a cause and its effect; rather hedenies the necessary character of this connection. In the FirstPosition of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlî brings theargument that observation cannot prove causal connections. Observationcan only conclude that the cause and its effect occurconcomitantly:
Observation (mushâhada) points towards a concomitantoccurrence (al-husûl ‘indahu) but not to acombined occurrence (al-husûl bihi) and that there is noother cause (‘illa) for it. (al-Ghazâlî2000a, 167.)
It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this argument thatal-Ghazâlî denied the existence of causal connections.While such connections cannot be proven through observation (orthrough any other means), they may or may not exist. In the FirstPosition al-Ghazâlî rejects the view that the connectionbetween an efficient cause and its effect is simply necessary perse, meaning that the proximate cause alone is fully responsiblefor the effect and that nothing else is also necessary for the effectto occur. In another work this position is described as one held by“materialists” (dahriyûn) who deny that theworld has a cause or a maker (al-Ghazâlî 1959a, 19 = 2000b,61). The Mu’tazilite view of tawallud, meaning thathumans are the sole creators of their own actions and their immediateeffects, also falls under this position (al-Ghazâlî 2000,226.13–14). Like in the connection between a father and his son,where the father is not the only efficient cause for theson's existence, so there may be in every causal connection efficientcauses involved other than the most obvious or the most proximateone. The proximate efficient cause may be just the last element in along chain of efficient causes that extends via the heavenlyrealm. The intellects of the celestial spheres, which were thought tobe referred to in revelation as “angels,” may be middleelements or intermediaries in causal chains that all have itsbeginning in God. Al-Ghazâlî rejects the position of thematerialists and the Mu’tazilites because it does not takeaccount of the fact that God is the ultimate efficient cause of theobserved effect. God may create this effect directly or by way ofsecondary causality. Discussing the example that when fire touches aball of cotton it causes it to combust, al-Ghazâlî writesabout the First Position that the fire alone causescombustion:
![]() This [position] is one of those that we deny. Rather we say that theefficient cause (fâ’il) of the combustion throughthe creation of blackness in the cotton and through causing theseparation of its parts and turning it into coal or ashes isGod—either through the mediation of the angels or withoutmediation. (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 167.)
Secondary causality is a viable option for al-Ghazâlîthat he is willing to accept. Still he does not accept the teachings ofAvicenna, which are discussed in the Second Position. Avicenna combinessecondary causality with the view that causal processes proceed withnecessity and in accord with the natures of things, and not by way ofdeliberation and choice on the side of the efficient cause. Theultimate efficient cause in a cosmology of secondary causality is, ofcourse, God. The Avicennan opponent of the Second Position teachessecondary causality plus he holds that the causal connectionsfollow with necessity from the nature of the First Being. They are notcreated through God's deliberation and choice but are a necessaryeffect of God's essence.
7.3 Two Different Concepts of the Modalities
When al-Ghazâlî writes that the connection between acause and its effect is not necessary he attacks Avicenna'snecessitarian ontology not his secondary causality. The dispute betweenal-Ghazâlî and Avicenna is not about causality as such,rather about the necessary nature of God's creation. Kukkonen(2000) and Dutton (2001) have shown that the two start with quitedifferent assumptions about necessity. Avicenna's view of themodalities follows the statistical model of Aristotle and connects thepossibility of a thing to its temporal actuality (Bäck 1992). Atemporally unqualified sentence like, “Fire causes cotton tocombust,” contains implicitly or explicitly a reference to thetime of utterance as part of its meaning. If this sentence is truewhenever uttered, it is necessarily true. If its truth-value can changein the course of time, it is possible. If such a sentence is falsewhenever uttered, it is impossible (Hintikka 1973, 63–72,84–6, 103–5, 149–53). In Aristotelian modal theories,modal terms were taken to refer to the one and only historical world ofours. For Avicenna, fire necessarily causes cotton to combust becausethe sentence “Fire causes cotton to combust,” was, is, andwill always be true.
Al-Ghazâlî's understanding of the modalitiesdeveloped in the context of Ash’arite kalâm anddoes not share the statistical model of Aristotle and Avicenna.Ash’arite kalâm developed an understanding that iscloser to our modern view of the modalities as referring to synchronicalternative states of affairs. In the modern model, the notion ofnecessity refers to what obtains in all alternatives, the notion ofpossibility refers to what obtains in at least in one alternative, andthat which is impossible does not obtain in any conceivable state ofaffairs (Knuuttila 1998, 145). Ash’arite kalâmpursued the notion that God is the particularizing agent(mukhassis) of all events in the world, who determines, forinstance, when things come into existence and when they fall out ofexistence (Davidson 1987, 159–61, 176–80). The idea ofparticularization (takhsîs) includes implicitly anunderstanding of possible worlds that are different from this. Theprocess of particularization makes one of several alternatives actual.In his Creed for Nizâm al-Mulk, al-Juwaynîexplains the Ash’arite understanding of the modalities. Everysound thinking person finds within herself, “the knowledge aboutthe possibility of what is possible, the necessity of what isnecessary, and the impossibility of what is impossible”(al-Juwaynî 1948, 8–9). We know this distinctioninstinctively without learning it from others and without furtherinquiry into the world. It is an impulse (badîha) in ourrational judgment (‘aql). Al-Juwaynî explains thisimpulse:
The impulsive possibility that the intellect rushes to apprehendwithout [any] consideration, thinking, or inquiry is what becomesevident to the intelligent person when he sees a building. [Thebuilding] is a possibility that comes into being (min jawâzhudûthihi). The person knows decisively and offhand that theactual state (hudûth) of that building is from among itspossible states (ja’izât) and that it is notimpossible in the intellect had it not been built. (al-Juwaynî1948, 9)
The intelligent person (al-‘âqil)—heresimply meaning a person with full rational capacity—realizes thatall the features of the building, its height, its length, its form,etc., are actualized possibilities and could be different. The sameapplies to the time when the building is built. We immediately realize,al-Juwaynî says, that there is a synchronic alternative state tothe actual building. This is what we call possibility or more preciselycontingency (imkân). Realizing that there is such analternative is an important part of our understanding: “Theintelligent person cannot realize in his mind anything about the statesof the building without comparing it with what is contingent like it(imkân mithlihi) or what is different from it(khilâfihi).” (al-Juwaynî 1948,9.)
In at least three passages of the Incoherenceal-Ghazâlî criticizes Avicenna's understanding of themodalities. Here he refers to another, closely related dispute, namelythat for Avicenna the modalities exist in reality while foral-Ghazâlî they exist only as judgments in the minds ofhumans (al-Ghazâlî 2000, 42.2–5, 124.10–11,207.4–14). He denies Avicenna's premise that possibilityneeds a substrate. This premise is Aristotelian—it is the basisto the principle of entelechy, namely that all things havepotentialities and are driven to actualize them (Dutton 2001,26–7) Al-Ghazâlî shifts, as Kukkonen (2000,488–9) puts it, the locus of the presumption of a thing'sactual existence from the plane of the actualized reality to the planeof mental conceivability.
When al-Ghazâlî says that “according to us” theconnection between the efficient cause and its effect is not necessary,he aims to point out that the connection could bedifferent even if it never will be different. For Avicenna, the factthat the connection never was different and never will be differentimplies that it is necessary. Nowhere in his works requiresal-Ghazâlî that any given causal connection was differentor will be different in order to be considered not necessary. We willsee that he, like Avicenna, assumes causal connections never were andnever will be different from what they are now. Still they are notnecessary, he maintains. The connection between a cause and its effectis contingent (mumkin) because an alternative to it isconceivable in our minds. We can imagine a world where fire does notcause cotton to combust. Or, to continue reading the initial statementof the 17th discussion:
(…) it is within divine power to create satiety withouteating, to create death without a deep cut (hazz) in the neck,to continue life after having received a deep cut in the neck, and soon to all connected things. The falâsifa deny thepossibility of [this] and claim it to be impossible.(al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 166.)
Of course, a world where fire doesn’t cause combustion incotton would be radically different from the one we live in. A changein a single causal connection would probably imply that many otherswould be different as well. Still, such a world can be conceived in ourminds, which means it is a possible world. God, however, did not chooseto create such an alternative possible world (Griffel 2009, 172–3).
In the initial statement of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlîclaims that “the connection [between cause and effect] is due tothe prior decision (taqdîr) of God.” When heobjects to Avicenna that these connections are not necessary,al-Ghazâlî wishes to point out that God could have chosento create an alternative world where the causal connections aredifferent from what they are. Avicenna denied this. This world is thenecessary effect of God's nature and a world different from thisone is unconceivable. Al-Ghazâlî objects and says thisworld is the contingent effect of God's free will and Hisdeliberate choice between alternative worlds.
7.4 The Cum-Possibility of Occasionalism and Secondary Causality
In the Second Position of the 17th discussion al-Ghazâlîpresents two different “approaches” (singl.maslak) in order to counter Avicenna's position that thenecessary connection between existing causes and effects renders somemiracles in the Qur’an impossible. In the First Approachal-Ghazâlî denies the existence of “natures”(tabâ’i’) and of causal connections andmaintains that God creates every event immediately. This is the part ofthe 17th discussion where he presents occasionalism as a viableexplanation of what we have usually come to refer as efficientcausality. God's eternal and unchanging knowledge alreadycontains all events that will happen in creation. By creatingcombustion every time fire touches cotton, God follows a certain custom(‘âda). In real terms, however, combustion occursonly concomitantly when fire touches cotton and is not connected tothis event. In the First Approach of the Second Position in the 17thdiscussion (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 169.14–171.11) and insome of his later works (al-Ghazâlî 1962), he maintainsthat causal processes may simply be the result of God's habit andthat He creates what we consider a cause and its effect individuallyand immediately. When God wishes to perform a miracle and confirm themission of one of His prophets, he suspends His habit and omits tocreate the effect He usually does according to His habit.
The Second Approach (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 171.12–174.8)presents a very different explanation of prophetical miracles. Marmura(1981) called it “al-Ghazâlî's second causaltheory.” Here al-Ghazâlî accepts the existence of“natures” (tabâ’i’) and of unchangingconnections between causes and their effects. In the second causaltheory al-Ghazâlî merely points out that despite humanefforts in the natural sciences, we are far away from knowing allcauses and explaining all processes in nature. It may well be the casethat those miracles that the falâsifa deny have immanentnatural causes that are unknown to us. When Moses, for instance, threwhis stick to the ground and it changed into a serpent (Qur’an,7.107, 20.69, 26.32) the material of the wooden stick may haveundergone a rapid transformation and become a living animal. We knowthat wood disintegrates with time and becomes earth that fertilizes andfeeds plants. These plants are, in turn, the fodder of herbivores,which are consumed by carnivores like snakes. Thefalâsifa cannot exclude that some unknown cause mayrapidly expedite the usually slow process where the matter of a woodenstick is transformed into a snake. These and other explanations givenin the Second Approach are only examples of how the propheticalmiracles may be the result of natural causes that are not fullyunderstood by humans.
Marmura (1965, 183; 1981, 97) rejected the suggestion thatal-Ghazâlî might have held occasionalism and secondarycausality as two cum-possible cosmological explanations. Marmuraconceded that al-Ghazâlî makes use of causalist language“sometimes in the way it is used in ordinary Arabic, sometimes ina more specifically Avicennian / Aristotelian way” and that thisusage of language is innovative for the Ash’arite schooldiscourse (1995, 89). Yet in all major points of Muslim theologyal-Ghazâlî held positions that follow closely the onesdeveloped by earlier Ash’arite scholars, namely the possibilityof miracles, the creation of humans acts, and God's freedomduring the creation of the universe (1995, 91, 93–97,99–100). In Marmura's view, al-Ghazâlî neverdeviated from occasionalism, while he sometimes expressed his opinionsin ambiguous language that mocked philosophical parlance, probably inorder to lure followers of falsâfa into theAsh’arite occasionalist camp.
That al-Ghazâlî considered occasionalism and secondarycausality as cum-possible explanations of God's creative activityis stated, however, in a passage in the 20th discussion of theIncoherence on the subject of corporeal resurrection in theafterlife. The falâsifa argue that corporealresurrection is impossible because it requires the transformation ofsubstances like iron into a garment, which is impossible. In hisresponse, al-Ghazâlî refers to the Second Approach of theSecond Position in the 17th discussion where, he says, he had alreadydiscussed this problem. He argues that the unusually rapid recycling ofthe matter that makes up the piece of iron into a piece of garment isnot impossible. “But this is not the point at issue here,”al-Ghazâlî says. The real question is whether such atransformation “occurs purely through [divine] power without anintermediary, or through one of the causes.” He continues:
Both these two views are possible for us (kilâhumâmumkinân ‘indanâ) (…) [In the 17thdiscussion we stated] that the connection of connected things inexistence is not by way of necessity but through habitual events, whichcan be disrupted. Thus, these events come about through the power ofGod without the existence of their causes. The second [view] is that wesay: This is due to causes, but it is not a condition that the cause[here] would be one that is well-known (ma’hûd).Rather, in the treasury of things that are enacted by [God's]power there are wondrous and strange things that one hasn’t comeacross. These are denied by someone who thinks that only those thingsexists that he experiences similar to people who deny magic, sorcery,the talismanic arts, [prophetic] miracles, and the wondrous deeds [doneby saints]. (al-Ghazâlî 2000a, 222.) ![]()
Al-Ghazâlî maintained this undecided position throughouthis lifetime. Given the fact that neither observation nor any othermeans of knowing (including revelation) gives a decisive proof for theexistence or non-existence of a connection between a cause and itseffect, we must suspend our judgment on this matter. God may createthrough the mediation of causes that He employs, or directly withoutsuch mediation. This undecided position is unfortunately nowhereclearly explained. It can be gathered from isolated statements like theone above and the fact that after the Incoherenceal-Ghazâlî wrote books where he maintained a distinctlyoccasionalist cosmology (al-Ghazâlî 1962) and others likethe 35th book of his Revival or the Niche of Lights,where he uses language that is explicitly causalist. In none of thesebooks, however, he commits himself to the position that the cause isconnected to its effect. God may create the two independently from oneanother or He may create them through the mediation of secondarycauses. In his very last work, completed only days before his death,al-Ghazâlî discusses whether God creates “through themediation” (bi-wâsita) of his creations or not,and maintains that the matter cannot be settled decisively(al-Ghazâlî 1985, 68–69).
In all this al-Ghazâlî accepted the unchanging character ofthis creation. Once God chose to create this world among alternatives,He also chose not to change the rules that govern it. While it isconceivable and therefore possible that God would break his habit orintervene in the assigned function of the secondary causes, He informsus in His revelation that He will not do so. In the 31st book of hisRevival, al-Ghazâlî says that God creates allthings one after the other in an orderly manner. After making clearthat this order represents God's habit (sunna), hequotes the Qur’an (33:62 and 48:23): “You will not find anychange in God's habit.” (al-Ghazâlî1937–38, 11:2084–85.) This verse is quoted several times in theRevival; in one passage al-Ghazâlî adds that weshould not think God will ever change His habit (ibid, 4:12).Prophetical miracles are merely extraordinary occurrences that takeplace within the system of the strictly habitual operation ofGod's actions or within the “natural laws” thatgovern the secondary causes. Miracles are programmed into God'splan for His creation, so to speak, from the very beginning and do notrepresent a direct intervention or a suspension of God's lawfulactions (Frank 1992, 59; idem, 1994, 20). Given that there will neverbe a break in God's habit, an occasionalist universe will alwaysremain indistinguishable from one governed by secondary causality.
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Al-Farabi | Al-Razi [Fakhr al-Din] | Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: natural philosophy and natural science | causation: medieval theories of | Duns Scotus, John | future contingents: medieval theories of | Ibn Rushd [Averroes] | Ibn Sina [Avicenna] | Maimonides: the influence of Islamic thought on | modality: medieval theories of | Philoponus
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